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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over 750 million aviation passengers were carried in the 
United States during 2006 (JPDO, June, 2007).  By 2012 to 2015 
that number could exceed one billion.  The existing air traffic 
control system cannot adjust to the current and anticipated growth in aviation traffic.  
NextGen is the Federal Aviation Administration’s term for the next generation air traffic 
control system.  The planned system is a wide ranging transformation of the entire 
national air transportation system to meet future demands and avoid gridlock in the sky 
and at airports.  NextGen uses active networking technology which is tailored to the 
individual needs of users within the system.  It moves away from legacy analog 
technologies and ground-based radar to new satellite and airborne digital data 
technologies. These new capabilities and the highly interdependent technologies that 
support them will change the way the system operates, reduce congestion, and improve 
the passenger experience (FAA, 2008).  
The multi-agency NextGen initiative is led by the Joint Planning & Development 
Office (JPDO) and includes participation by the Department of Transportation, Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Commerce (DoC), National Aeronautics & 
Space Administration (NASA), and the White House 
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Office of Science & Technology Policy, plus interested public, commercial and academic 
entities. 
According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 2008), some of the 
benefits that NextGen brings to aviation include: 
• Air-to-air surveillance capability 
• Surveillance to remote or inhospitable areas that do not have radar coverage 
• Real-time traffic and aeronautical information in the cockpit 
• Reduced separation and greater predictability of departure and arrival times 
• Common separation standards, both horizontal and vertical, for all classes of 
airspace 
• Improved ability of airlines to manage traffic and aircraft fleets 
• Improved ability of air traffic controllers to plan arrivals and departures far in 
advance 
• Reduced cost of the infrastructure needed to operate the National Airspace 
System (NAS) 
The positive effect on safety for portions of NextGen have already been proven in 
prototypes including the Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 
(Gardner, 2005, p. 115), ADS-B has been utilized for several years in field testing 
conducted in both Alaska and the Ohio River Valley.  Additional studies have been 
undertaken to understand the potential benefits and incentives of ADS-B (Lester & 
Hansman, 2007).  The FAA describes ADS-B as the backbone of the NextGen system. 
While the potential safety, operational, and financial implications of NextGen are 
known, the underlying digital communications technologies utilized to produce these 
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benefits have not previously been used to monitor and control aviation.  Data 
transmissions occurring between aircraft, ground monitoring stations, and satellites share 
risks common to the information flowing between computers over any digital network. 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem of focus for this research was the potential security risk imposed by 
implementing the active network technologies utilized by ADS-B in the NextGen air 
traffic control system, and more specifically the air-to-air, air-to-ground, and satellite-to-
air links used by NextGen.  Factors contributing to risk include interests both internal and 
external to the United States that could benefit from manipulating, impairing, or data 
mining the digital information being exchanged by aircraft and controllers.  A risk 
analysis is needed of the ADS-B data network proposed for NextGen compared to 
industry best practices for system and network security.  The NextGen system offers a 
wealth of improvements to national and international aviation safety, but may create 
unnecessary risks if the technologies used to implement the system do not include 
appropriate data and software security. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to identify and describe the risks perceived by 
experts to be inherent to the active network within the ADS-B portion of the proposed 
NextGen system by comparing the enterprise architecture against current best practices in 
computer network security.  Many of the evolving standards for computer network 
security have been developed through the efforts of information technology vendors 
including Cisco Systems and Microsoft.  Additional groups have been formed to create 
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recognized industry certifications such the Certified Information Systems Security 
Professional (CISSP) and Certified Software Security Lifecycle Professional (CSSLP) 
from the International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium (ISC2), and 
the Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) from the SysAdmin, Audit, 
Network, Security (SANS) Institute.   
Many of the best practices and standards developed within the commercial sector 
have been codified within the public sector and have resulted in both legislation and 
government standards for network security.  The National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has also published a series of Special Publications which provide 
guidance for securing and assessing risk in computing systems.  NIST publications of 
note for this study included the Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems (National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2002a), and the Guide 
for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2006).    Benchmark legislation was enacted in 2002 
entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) (United States 
Congress Committee on Government Reform, 2003).  
Research Questions 
The primary questions that this study sought to answer were:   
1. How does proposed ADS-B network design for the NextGen air traffic control 
system compare to government and commercial industry network security 
standards?   
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2. How does the ADS-B portion of the proposed NextGen network design perform 
when faced with common computer network threats such as Denial of Service, 
Session Hijacking, and Network Eavesdropping?   
3. How does the ADS-B portion of the NextGen network model insure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability? 
Definition of Terms 
The aerospace industry in general and NextGen in particular is rife with acronyms and 
special terms that describe the components discussed in this study.  To assist the reader in 
deciphering this document and developing an understanding of the material a definition 
of terms and acronyms have been provided in Table 1.  
Table 1. 
Definition of Terms 
Term Description 
802.11 Wireless computer network standard commonly found in homes, offices, and businesses like Starbucks 
1090-ES  
1090 MHz Extended Squitter. One of two data link technologies 
which are supported by the ADS-B portion of NextGen.  1090ES 
operates at 1090 MHz, and uses the Mode-S Extended Squitter 
standard common to SSR 
ACSS  Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems 
ADS-B ARC ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
ADS-B  
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast: NextGen uses 
1090ES and/or UAT signals from vehicles to provide air traffic 
controllers and pilots with accurate position information and provide a 
real-time display of air or ground traffic 
ADS-R  Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Rebroadcast 
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Term Description 
AGL  Above Ground Level 
AIRMET  Airmen's Meteorological Information 
ANSP  Air Navigation Service Provider 
AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
ARC Aviation Rulemaking Committee 
ARTCC  Air Route Traffic Control Centers 
ATC  Air Traffic Control 
ATCRBS  Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System 
ATM  Air Traffic Management 
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 
CAVS  CDTI Assisted Visual Separation 
CDA  Continuous Descent Approach 
CDTI  Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CISSP Certified Information Systems Security Professional 
ConOps  Concept of Operations 
CAN Center for Naval Analyses and Institute for Public Research 
CNA Computer Network Attack 
COI Community of Interest 
CPDLC  Controller Pilot Data Link Communications 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check 
CSSLP Certified Secure Software Lifecycle Professional 
CTAF  Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 
DER Designated Engineering Representative 
DME  Distance Measuring Equipment 
DoD Department of Defense (U.S.) 
DoDAF Department of Defense Architectural Framework 
DoS Denial of Service attack 
DoT Department of Transportation 
DRM Digital Rights Management 
EFB  Electronic Flight Bag 
EHS  Enhanced Surveillance 
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Term Description 
ELS  Elementary Surveillance 
Eurocontrol The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAA Part 135 Commuter and On-Demand Air Carrier regulations 
FEC Forward Error Correction 
FIS-B  Flight Information Service – Broadcast 
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 
FMS  Flight Management System 
GA  General Aviation 
GBT  Ground Based Transceiver 
GIAC Global Information Assurance Certification 
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS  Global Positioning System: determines a 4D position using satellites. 
HFOM  Horizontal Figure of Merit 
HPL  Horizontal Protection Limit 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization 
IFR  Instrument Flight Rules 
ILS  Instrument Landing System 
IMC  Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
INS Inertial Navigation System 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISC2 The International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium 
ITT ITT Corporation, prime contractor to the FAA for the development and deployment of ADS-B in the United States 
IWP Integrated Work Plan 
JPDO  Joint Planning and Development Office: a partnership of agencies and stakeholders who are planning the NextGen air traffic control system. 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
MAPS  Minimum Aviation System Performance Standard 
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Term Description 
METAR  Aviation routine weather reports 
MFD  Multifunction Display 
Micro-EARTS  Micro En route Automated Radar Tracking System 
MIT  Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
MLAT  Multilateration 
MLS  Microwave Landing System 
MOPS  Minimum Operational Performance Standards 
MSL  Mean Sea Level 
MVFR  Marginal Visual Flight Rules 
Multilateration 
or hyperbolic positioning, is the process of locating an object by 
accurately computing the time difference of arrival (TDOA) of a 
signal emitted from the object to three or more receivers 
NACV  Navigational Accuracy Category for Velocity 
NAS  National Airspace System 
NEXCOM  Next Generation Air/Ground Communication 
NEXRAD  Next Generation Weather 
NextGen  Next Generation Air Transportation System 
NIC  Navigational Integrity Category 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NOTAM  Notice to Airmen 
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
NSA National Security Agency (U.S.) 
NTSB  National Transportation and Safety Board 
NUC  Navigation Uncertainty Category 
OAM Original Aircraft Manufacturer 
OV Operational View 
OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix, as defined in DoDAF 
PRM  Precision Runway Monitoring 
PSR  Primary Surveillance Radar 
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Term Description 
RF Radio Frequency 
RNP  Required Navigational Performance 
RTCA  
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics or RTCA, Inc.: an 
organization which provides technical recommendations to the FAA 
comprised of over 335 members including foreign and domestic 
government agencies, airlines, airspace users, airport associations, 
labor unions, aviation service & equipment suppliers 
SANS SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security Institute 
SAMM  Surface Area Movement Management 
SCAP Security Certification and Authorization Package 
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research Programme: the European version of NextGen 
SFAR  Special Federal Aviation Regulations 
SIGMET  Significant Meteorological Information 
SIL  Surface Integrity Level 
Spoofing 
Any technique used to inject false or forged data into a network.  In 
the case of NextGen this could be one or more non-existent vehicles, 
or altered location, speed, or timing data for an existing vehicle 
SSR  Secondary Surveillance Radar 
SUA  Special Use Airspace 
TAF  Terminal Area Forecast 
TAS  Traffic Awareness System 
TAWS  Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
TCAS  Traffic Collision and Alerting System 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
TDOA Time Difference of Arrival 
TFR  Temporary Flight Restriction 
TIS-B  Traffic Information Service – Broadcast 
Triangulation uses a baseline and at least two angles measured such as with receiver antenna diversity and phase comparison 
TSO  Technical Standard Order 
TWIP  Terminal Weather Information for Pilots 
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Term Description 
UAT  Universal Access Transceiver 
UHF  Ultra High Frequency 
URET  User Request Evaluation Tools 
UTC Coordinated Universal Time 
VDL  VHF Datalink 
VFR  Visual Flight Rules 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
VMC  Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VPL  Vertical Protection Limit 
WAAS  Wide Area Augmentation System 
WSI  Weather Services International 
XM Satellite-based weather and radar data service 
 
Significance of the Study 
Is the sky falling?  This study will provide valuable information to determine the 
security risks surrounding implementation of the proposed NextGen air traffic control 
system.  A study of this type should be extremely significant to many different groups 
which directly and/or indirectly utilize or could be impacted by air transportation.  This 
study should be of interest to virtually the entire U.S. population who use products 
delivered by aircraft, fly for business or personal travel, or may be over flown by aircraft 
controlled by the system.  The study should be of particular interest to the federal 
agencies comprising the Joint Program Development Office, non-governmental interests 
in the aerospace and transportation industries such as Boeing, Lockheed, Federal Express, 
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American Airlines, Honeywell, L-3, and other aviation manufacturing and transportation 
companies. 
Unmanaged risks to the air traffic control system could result in flight delays, 
failed landings, mid-air collision, and other aviation disasters which would have potential 
impacts on passengers, pilots, crew members, ground personnel, and innocent bystanders. 
Assumptions 
 A principle assumption made for this study was that adequate information 
regarding the design and security of the NextGen air traffic control system could be 
obtained through currently published enterprise architecture documentation, industry 
standards groups, and via interviews of engineering resources who are implementing the 
system within the various stakeholders. 
Limitations 
One limitation of this study was that most of the NextGen system had yet to be 
implemented, the enterprise architecture is to some extent still evolving, and the entire 
system would not be completed until roughly 2025.  Some of these limitations, however, 
may also be advantageous as the outcomes of this study have the potential to positively 
impact the final implementation of NextGen security before it is completed, should 
significant risks be identified. 
 A second limitation of this study was the inability to obtain organization approval 
from each of the desired participants identified for the study.  In two cases, approvals 
were withheld because the organizations were concerned that the information was too 
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sensitive to share in the open forum of a research study.  In one additional case, the 
participants identified were unwilling to be formally interviewed or pursue organizational 
approvals for fear of career reprisals.   
The participants for this study came primarily from the aerospace industry which 
restricted the scope of this research.  The traditional design of qualitative research also 
limits the number of participants and restricts the ability to generalize results to the 
general population. 
Theoretical Framework 
The epistemology of the study was constructionism in that knowledge or truth 
was a product of consensus among selected participants in the context of the pertinent 
aerospace industry organizations.  The theoretical framework used was constructivism 
which is a form of interpretivism in that it focuses on the experiences of the subjects 
interviewed and their direct lived experience. The methodology was a qualitative 
thematic analysis based on the study of existing design documents for the NextGen air 
traffic management system, computer security best practices, and interviews.  Interviews 
were conducted and analyzed using a constant comparative method to arrive at emerging 
themes.  In accordance with the characteristics of qualitative research, this study includes 
“clear and detailed descriptions of the study that includes the voices of the participants 
(Gay, Mills, & Airasian, 2006, p.402).”  Table 2 shows the theoretical prespective 
utilized for this study. 
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Table 2. 
Theoretical Perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organization of the Study 
Five main components were addressed in this study.  The components include an 
introduction to the study, a review of available literature related to the security features 
within the proposed NextGen design, a methods section, a section on data collection and 
analysis, and a section of conclusions and recommendations. 
The introduction includes a discussion of the need for this study as well as who 
will benefit from the information.  An extensive set of terms is included for use against 
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literature reviewed and those used in this study, as well as a discussion of the significance 
of this study to the aerospace community of interest. 
The second section of the study is a review of literature section which provides 
additional information on the NextGen air traffic control system and will be organized to 
examine the least significant to most significant articles in relation to NextGen Active 
Network and ADS-B design, features, operational concepts, information exchange 
requirements, and known security concerns.  A summary of computer network security 
best practices including the most relevant aspects found pertaining to industry best 
practices and government standards of network security risks are included.   
A discussion of methods used for this research comprises the third section of the 
study, and includes a description of the research design, a description of the sample 
selection process, the instrumentation used, and the data analysis methods used in the 
study. 
The fourth section includes a description of each participant’s background, 
organizational affiliations, professional and academic credentials to show the depth of 
knowledge within the selected sample.  Findings from each of the participants 
interviewed are included which will be used to analyze the qualitative data collected.  A 
summary of the findings is included. 
The fifth and final section includes conclusions regarding the security objectives 
for the study and recommendations based on the literature and findings presented in this 
study, with additional recommendations for future research resulting from this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 In this section of the study, a review of related literature on the topics of the 
NextGen air traffic control system and industry best-practices for computer network 
security will be given.  The purpose of the review is to orient the audience to network 
security risks in relation to the proposed NextGen Active Network.  Multiple articles will 
be summarized in reverse order of relevance.  Articles are broken into two primary 
categories:  
• Studies and reports containing background information regarding the design of 
the NextGen air traffic management system, the associated active network(s) used 
for ADS-B, and available documentation discussing the potential security risks of 
NextGen system;  
• Computer network security standards and best-practice documents against which 
to analyze the potential risk of the NextGen specifications. 
Following the literature review is a summary of the most relevant information regarding 
the risk analysis. 
 Throughout the review of the literature, triangulation was used to assist in the 
development and confirmation of key concepts for the study, as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Triangulation Model. 
 
NextGen Active Network: ADS-B 
Several documents have initially been identified for inclusion in this study of 
NextGen.  To understand the overall design of the NextGen system, the Concept of 
Operations for the Next Generation Air Transportation System which was developed by 
the Joint Program Development Office has been reviewed (JPDO, June, 2007).  The 
Concept of Operations document specifies eight key capabilities necessary to achieve 
goals of NextGen, which include: 
• Network-Enabled Information Access 
• Performance-Based Operations and Services 
• Weather Assimilated into Decision-Making 
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• Layered, Adaptive Security 
• Broad-Area Precision Positioning, Navigation and Timing Services 
• Aircraft Trajectory-Based Operations 
• Equivalent Visual Operations 
• Super-Density Arrival/Departure Operations 
The benefits and incentives of moving to ADS-B are also highlighted in the initial ADS-
B Aviation Rulemaking Committee report (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 
2007). 
NextGen Features and Concepts 
The NextGen Concept of Operations document states that “at the heart of the 
NextGen concept is the information-sharing component known as net-centric 
infrastructure services or net-centricity” (Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), 
2007b, p.ES-2) and that the net-centricity component binds NextGen operational and 
enterprise services together creating a cohesive link.  The suite of enterprise services are 
to include “shared situational awareness, security, environment, and safety. (Joint 
Program Development Office (U.S.), 2007b, p.ES-2)” 
There are significant differences between the ADS-B solution being fielded in 
Europe, China, and Australia versus the NextGen ADS-B solution which allows users to 
select from two different versions of the data link for use in the United States.  
International and U.S. solutions both utilize the 1090-ES data link which is already 
installed in some fashion on virtually all air carriers and many general aviation aircraft in 
the form of a Mode S or Mode AC transponder; however, the U.S. solution also includes 
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a second more robust data link using the UAT standard which has been proposed for use 
in general aviation aircraft operating below 24,000 feet.  The UAT link provides 
additional bandwidth for uploading weather, radar, and additional in-flight data services 
which 1090-ES cannot accommodate.  The dual data link solution requires ground-based 
transceivers in order for both types of aircraft to receive information from aircraft 
transmitting on the other data link. 
A graphical overview of the NextGen system including the various communities 
of interest, federal agencies, industry and users as shown in the Concept of Operations is 
shown in Figure 1 (Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), June, 2007).  The focus of 
this study is the ADS-B portion of the NextGen Active Network, particularly focusing on 
the security aspects of both UAT and 1090-ES data links between aircraft and ground-
based transceivers which operate on both frequencies.  
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Figure 2. NextGen Functional Diagram.  Note: From the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System Enterprise Architecture (Joint Program Development Office 
(U.S.), 2007a, p.23) 
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Two of the more notable differences between the existing radar-based air traffic 
management system and the proposed NextGen air traffic management system’s ADS-B 
backbone revolve around the ability to not only provide high fidelity position information 
to air traffic controllers, but to also share that information between all NextGen equipped 
aircraft within both radar and non-radar service areas.  Additional features of NextGen 
include the ability to display additional networked information including weather and 
traffic information without onboard radar or TCAS using the FIS-B and TIS-B services.  
A functional diagram of the ADS-B system is shown in Figure 2 (ADS-B Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee, 2008). 
 
Figure 3. ADS-B Functional Diagram (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2008, 
p.D-3).  
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A sample CDTI display is shown in Figure 3 including a ground-based weather 
radar overlay transmitted via the NextGen Active Network integrated into the pilot’s 
display.  In the initial implementation of NextGen, this information is limited to aircraft 
utilizing the UAT link and within 200 nautical miles of a ground based transceiver (ADS-
B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2008). 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Sample CDTI Display including Weather. (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee, 2008, p.D-7)  
 
Traffic information combined from both ADS-B signals and ground-based 
secondary surveillance radar may also be received via ground based transceivers of the 
NextGen system, and is also limited to the UAT link.  A sample ADS-B display showing 
integrated traffic data is shown in Figure 4 (Flt Tech Online, 2009). 
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Figure 5. Sample Garmin ADS-B cockpit display including traffic and weather (Flt Tech 
Online, 2009).  
Another important feature of NextGen is improved management of aircraft and 
vehicular traffic while on the ground at airports.  The NextGen system is designed to 
assist in preventing accidents by displaying all ADS-B equipped vehicles on the CDTI.  
This could include not only aircraft taxiing, taking off, and landing but could also 
encompass other service vehicles at airports including fuel, catering, freight, and other 
maintenance traffic common to airport operations.  A satellite view of the Louisville 
International Airport including an inset of the cockpit version of the ground airport 
display is shown in Figure 5.  This feature is particularly useful for night or foul weather 
operations(ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2007). 
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Figure 6.Sample ADS-B ground traffic display (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee, 2007, p.25) 
 
Applying the advantages provided by NextGen through the use of ADS-B and 
associated technologies will allow reduced separation of aircraft flying into and out of 
high density airports such as Atlanta, Chicago, and Los Angeles which are currently 
limited by the accuracy and timeliness of radar information.  Reduced separation 
increases the usability of the ground facility by increasing the number of aircraft that may 
takeoff and land within a given timeframe negating the need for additional runways and 
flight delays.  Oceanic and other remote areas not covered by existing primary radar 
services also benefit from these services as current in-trail standards require a 15 minute 
window separating aircraft flying between continents.  The bottom line to all of the 
advances and advantages within ADS-B and the NextGen air traffic control system is 
increased safety and efficiency within the national airspace system. 
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Safety and efficacy testing of the ADS-B concept was accomplished in the 
Alaskan region by the FAA beginning in 1999 through no-cost equipage of all FAA Part 
135 aircraft.  The increases in safety during the test have been quantitatively shown in 
other studies, including a Northcentral University study which concluded that ADS-B 
technology “had an effect upon the reduction of the accident/incident rates in the Alaskan 
region” (Gardner, 2005, p.115).  ADS-B has already been fielded in Australia, Canada, 
China, and multiple standards organizations have moved to standardize on the 1090-ES 
platform of ADS-B including ICAO and Eurocontrol.  Though very similar in practice, 
ADS-B systems are not entirely standardized.  An assessment of the similarities and 
differences between NextGen and SESAR, the system being fielded by Eurocontrol, was 
reviewed for security ramifications (Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), 2008a). 
NextGen Network 
To better understand the specifics regarding the information exchange 
requirements with the NextGen Active Network, a thorough review of Next Generation 
Air Transportation System (NextGen) Enterprise Architecture (JPDO, 2007a) was 
undertaken.  Appendix E: OV-3 is the portion of the Enterprise Architecture document 
containing the most comprehensive description of operational information flow and is 
designed to facilitate information-centric analysis.  For each of the seventeen information 
exchange requirements described in the document, specific attributes including name, 
description, source activity, operational node and sub-node, destination node and sub-
node, and destination activity were outlined.  Of particular interest to this study was the 
statement that additional attributes to the information exchange requirements could 
include such details information assurance, confidentiality, availability, integrity, access 
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control, and dissemination control, which directly correlate with existing information 
security standards.  The current version of the NextGen Enterprise Architecture does not 
include these details (Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), 2007a). 
As the NextGen program is still under development, the Joint Program 
Development Office does make a maturity statement that OV-3 will continue to grow in 
detail and maturity as the Enterprise Architecture is reviewed by stakeholder and working 
groups.  In conjunction with the Enterprise Architecture document, a review of the 
Security Annex Concept of Operations v.2 for the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (JPDO, 2007b) was also conducted.  Again, as the NextGen system is still under 
development, there are thoughtful descriptions of the overall concepts intended to provide 
integrated risk management by insuring secure people, secure airports, secure checked 
baggage, secure cargo and mail, secure airspace, and secure aircraft, but specifics 
regarding communications methodology are limited to pointers toward the 1090-ES and 
UAT standards which have been developed through RTCA, Inc., a consortium of 
interested government and industry representatives. 
Other literature reviewed to gain perspective on the technologies in use within the 
ADS-B portions of the NextGen network, relative assessment of their security as a 
medium for  air traffic control, and discussion of security needs within airborne networks 
included a study conducted at MIT which states that ADS-B broadcast data is not secure 
(Jochum, 2001) .  A conference paper presented at the Digital Avionics Systems 
Conference regarding efficient data link security states “Much like the Internet, this 
aeronautical communication environment is vulnerable to attacks by external entities , 
which may accidentally or maliciously jeopardize the safety and integrity of the ATN.” 
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(Olive, 2001, p.9.E.2-2); and went on to mention that “The primary areas of vulnerability 
are the air-ground data link and the terrestrial networks, which may include both private 
and public communication networks (Olive, 2001, p.9.E.2-2).”  Olive specifically 
discusses the needs for message authentication, data integrity, and access control 
although data confidentiality or encryption was excluded as it is “not an ICAO specified 
security requirement” since “communication monitoring and message traffic analysis do 
not pose a threat to air traffic safety (Olive, 2001, p.9.E.2-3)”. 
To zero in on the specific capabilities and limitations included in the current 
design of the NextGen Active Network, design documents describing communications 
methodologies from the Minimum Operational Performance Standards for both 1090-ES 
and Universal Access Transceiver Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
documents were reviewed.  The 1090-ES standards have been developed over a number 
of years and have been designed around legacy support for existing radar transponder 
technologies (RTCA Inc. (Firm), 2006).  The UAT standards have been developed much 
more recently and include additional capabilities such as larger packet sizes, higher 
transmission speeds, anonymous mode and encryption (RTCA Inc. (Firm), 2002).  
Another recent perspective which includes a discussion of ADS-B communications in the 
context of net-centric systems and applications or eEnabled aircraft is discussed and 
expresses concerns that “off-the-shelf wireless solutions can open vulnerabilities that give 
rise to security concerns with the eEnabled airplane (Sampigethaya, Poovendran, & 
Bushnell, 2008, p.1).” 
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Known Concerns with ADS-B Security 
The Federal Aviation Administration process for developing the new regulations 
which will define and mandate the phase-in and usage of ADS-B over the next 16 years 
involves a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, establishment of an Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee which includes government and interested parties, and discussions between 
the industry, public, and the FAA prior to dissemination of final regulations. As of this 
writing, the ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking committee has published two papers 
highlighting the benefits of ADS-B (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2007), 
and more recently a set of recommendations regarding the use of ADS-B within 
NextGen.   
Several of the latest recommendations from the ARC focus on security 
considerations.  Comments to the ARC on FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 7-15 
show that “17 commenters, including 2 domestic air carriers, an avionics manufacturer, 
an association, and the DOD commented that the ADS-B system was vulnerable to being 
used for malicious purposes.(ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2008, p.96)”  The 
malicious purposes mentioned include contentions that both 1090-ES and UAT are 
susceptible to denial jamming in the vicinity of ground stations, that 1090-ES is 
vulnerable to deceptive jamming (though UAT is less so), and that the proposed design is 
susceptible to  the transmission of phantom aircraft identities, locations and velocities.  
The ARC responds that “there is no greater threat to ADS-B aircraft than those with 
transponders or ACAS.” (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2008, p.99).  The 
rulemaking committee agrees that ADS-B spoofing is possible, but believes that 
alternative surveillance systems such as SSR, the use of passive multilateration, and non-
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cooperative surveillance systems are adequate to validate ADS-B reports and prevent 
spoofing.  The ARC recommends that FAA and other appropriate government agencies 
continue to study means of mitigating loss of GNSS signals due to intentional or 
unintentional interference.  Although the FAA’s current implementation plans call for 
retention of SSR and elimination of primary radar, NextGen budget proposals show a 
$287 million annual cost savings by elimination of radar. 
The most recent version of the NextGen Integrated Work Plan, released in 
September of 2008, highlighted the many moving parts that must be integrated to 
successfully implement the NextGen air traffic control system.  One of the appendices 
included in the IWP discusses outstanding policy issues which must be addressed prior to 
successful implementation (Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), 2008b).  Three 
policy issues were of interest to this study: 
• PI-0017, which calls for a policy to define the strategy for communications 
services in ground, space, airborne, and/or performance-based architectures 
and include a decision on use of an airborne internet. 
• PI-0021, which calls for a policy to protect access to over-the-air ADS-B and 
data communications information to prevent unauthorized use of information.  
This issue goes on to state that the current “policy must change or ADS-B 
standards and avionics must be modified to transmit encrypted information. 
(Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), 2008b, p.Appendix IV-5)” 
• PI-0024, which calls for the development of policies to define the 
organization(s) that will maintain ownership of a central information 
repository, handle archived data to protective privacy and proprietary 
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information, and act as a liaison with ICAO.  This issue goes on to 
recommend that the NextGen unclassified Mobile Routing and Domain 
Network Services operated by the FAA be utilized as the root of the domain 
for establishing policies and protecting information. 
Another recent study, co-presented by representatives from France and Australia 
at the Seventh Meeting of ADS-B Study and Implementation Task Force sponsored by 
ICAO in Chengdu, China during August of 2008 squarely addressed the three pillars of 
network security described in the Federal Information Security Management Act citing 
considerations toward data confidentiality, integrity, and availability (ICAO, 2008).  The 
study includes recommendations that the aviation community should be “aware of 
possible ADS-B security specific issues (ICAO, 2008, p.5)” and should “address 
appropriate mitigation applicable in each operational environment, in accordance with 
ATM interoperability requirements. (ICAO, 2008, p.5)”  The final recommendation of 
the study suggests that “additional studies should be made to identify potential encryption 
and authentication techniques” but also that the “distribution of encryption keys to a large 
number of ADS-B receivers is likely to be problematic.(ICAO, 2008, p.5)” 
Computer Network Security Best-Practices 
To develop a baseline for IT industry best practices, several government and 
commercial sources were selected.  Two companies in the United States represent the 
majority of computer network operating systems and network routing and switching: 
Microsoft and Cisco Systems.  Due to their market standing, both companies invest 
heavily in security research, and assist their user communities in expanding the body of 
knowledge regarding security best practices.  In addition, the National Institute of 
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Standards and Technology represents a compendium of thought leadership within the 
computing and network environments. 
Cisco Systems Changed Threat Landscape 
Cisco Systems is the world’s largest manufacturer of routing and switching 
equipment currently holding a 51% share of the service provider router market.  As a 
leader in the network industry, Cisco continuously researches security issues and 
publishes white papers regarding identification and mitigation of network security threats 
which give a broad view of the risks to computer networks.  The threats experienced by 
contemporary computer networks are far removed from those envisioned when the 
Internet was conceived.  The differences in security requirements are referred to as the 
Changed Threat Landscape, and graphically depicted over time in Figure 6 (Cisco, 2007). 
 
Figure 7. The Changed Threat Landscape, (Cisco, 2007, p.1). 
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Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle 
Microsoft also has a large interest in systems and network security with over 
89.6% of the operating system market worldwide.  Microsoft has taken an aggressive 
stance toward security following several large-scale security breaches and as early as 
2002 enhanced security through their Trustworthy Computing initiative.  Microsoft’s 
latest network operating systems and applications are developed using common standards 
and industry best practices based on the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) and 
toolsets which include the SDL Threat Modeling Tool and Optimization Model which are 
freely shared with the public (Keizer, 2008).  Microsoft’s methodologies for defining and 
containing risks give a different perspective from Cisco, and yet focus on current and 
coming threats in securing data networks.  The framework for the Security Development 
Lifecycle is shown in Figure 7 (Microsoft, 2009).  The current state of the NextGen air 
traffic control system falls between the Requirements, Design, and Implementation 
phases of the Security Development Lifecycle as described in Version 2.0 of the NextGen 
Enterprise Architecture (Joint Program Development Office (U.S.), 2007a). 
 
Figure 8.  The Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle, (Microsoft, 2009, p.1). 
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Government Standards and Industry Best Practices 
The security studies and publications presented in the commercial sector translate 
to, and are often the result of, academic studies and government standards developed 
within the public sector.  A series of documents were reviewed for applicability to this 
study, primarily utilizing the document library of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology. 
Within the past six years, NIST has published a series of special publications 
which were also used as reference points while developing the research questions and 
interview questionnaires for this study, including the Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems (National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 
2002a), Wireless Network Security (National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(U.S.), 2002b), Guideline on Network Security Testing (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (U.S.), 2003), Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information 
Processing Systems (National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2006), and 
Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2008). 
The review of NIST special publications’ applicability to NextGen airborne 
network issues highlighted two standards from the Federal Information Processing 
Standards library.  FIPS Publication 191 which provides guidance for the analysis of 
local area network security was reviewed, however, it was deemed a poor fit in that the 
NextGen ADS-B airborne network differs significantly from a conventional LAN.  ADS-
B aircraft and ground transmissions are intended to be received by all aircraft and ground 
stations within a reception radius and therefore the scope of the network cannot be 
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defined “within a moderately sized geographic area over a physical communications 
channel of moderate rates” (National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.), 1994, 
p.6).  FIPS Publication 199 was also reviewed to categorize the security risks inherent to 
the NextGen ADS-B network.  Table 3 summarizes the potential impact definitions for 
each security objective of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2004). 
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Table 3. 
Potential Security Impact Definitions, adapted from FIPS Pub 199 (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (U.S.), 2004) 
 
 POTENTIAL SECURITY IMPACT 
OBJECTIVE LOW MODERATE HIGH 
Confidentiality 
Preserving authorized 
restrictions on 
information access 
and disclosure, 
including means for 
protecting personal 
privacy and 
proprietary 
information 
The unauthorized 
disclosure of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
limited adverse effect 
on organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
The unauthorized 
disclosure of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
serious adverse effect 
on organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
The unauthorized 
disclosure of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
severe or 
catastrophic adverse 
effect on 
organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
Integrity 
Guarding against 
improper information 
modification or 
destruction, and 
includes ensuring 
information non-
repudiation and 
authenticity 
The unauthorized 
modification or 
destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
limited adverse effect 
on organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
The unauthorized 
modification or 
destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
serious adverse effect 
on organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
The unauthorized 
modification or 
destruction of 
information could be 
expected to have a 
severe or 
catastrophic adverse 
effect on 
organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
Availability 
Ensuring timely and 
reliable access to and 
use of information 
The disruption of 
access to or use of 
information or an 
information system 
could be expected to 
have a limited adverse 
effect on 
organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
The disruption of 
access to or use of 
information or an 
information system 
could be expected to 
have a serious adverse 
effect on 
organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
The disruption of 
access to or use of 
information or an 
information system 
could be expected to 
have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse 
effect on 
organizational 
operations, 
organizational assets, 
or individuals 
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FIPS Publication 199 defines that security categorization, or SC, can be expressed 
as a generalized format using: SC information type = [(confidentiality, impact), (integrity, 
impact), (availability, impact)] where the acceptable values for each potential impact are 
low, moderate, high, or not applicable.  The airborne and ground-based ADS-B links 
used by the NextGen air traffic control system would therefore be classified as shows in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. 
NextGen ADS-B Security Categorization 
Security Objective NextGen ADS-B Categorization 
Confidentiality Low.  ADS-B information is transmitted in the clear to allow 
other aircraft to recognize and respond to potential conflicts.  
There is a potential that tracking information captured by 
unauthorized sources could use the data for commercial gain 
(privacy issue).  This would not cause a NextGen system 
disruption. 
Integrity High.  If ADS-B data is improperly modified, destroyed, or 
false information is transmitted from a non-authentic source 
the NextGen air traffic control system could become unusable 
and legacy air traffic control methods would have to be 
employed to prevent a complete loss of system usability. 
Availability High.  If the 1090-ES and/or UAT links used to support ADS-
B data experience interference due to jamming, denial of 
service, or excessive data traffic the NextGen air traffic 
control system could become unusable and legacy air traffic 
control methods would have to be employed to prevent a 
complete loss of system usability. 
 
The Security Categorization formula for the NextGen ADS-B network can be expressed 
as:  SC = (Low, High, High), or averaged across all three objectives as:  SC = High. 
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Summary of the Literature Review 
The NextGen air traffic control system is poised to provide dramatic 
improvements to the management of air travel, in-flight safety, and airport scalability 
worldwide.  Although the NextGen enterprise architecture and security annex 
specifications indicate that secure network communications are to be included in the 
system design, other available literature indicates that network security has been 
considered but is not a demonstrated part of the existing design when compared to 
industry best practices including both government and commercial standards.
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
In the Methodology section of the study, three primary topics are discussed.  The 
first topic covers the research design including the qualitative risk analysis.  The second 
topic includes the selection of the sample.  The third topic of this section presents the 
type of instruments that were used to collect data for this study and their reliability and 
validity, the overall design of the study, and its’ appropriateness in answering the 
proposed research questions.  A final description of the procedure used to conduct the 
study is also included. 
Research Design 
Qualitative Risk Analysis 
 The research design selected for this study is a Qualitative Risk Analysis.  
Qualitative Risk Analysis assesses the impact and likelihood of the identified risks in a 
rapid and cost-effective manner.  By evaluating the priority of risks with consideration to 
impact on NextGen’s security objectives, this design provides a foundation for additional 
focused quantitative analysis or follow-on risk response plans.
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Selection of the Sample 
This study utilized a combination of purposive and qualitative sampling leading to 
a snowball sampling technique.  Purposive sampling is typical of qualitative research.  
The initial purposive sample of organizations was selected because the organizations 
were engaged in the design, development, implementation or user community 
surrounding NextGen and were “believed to be representative of a given population” 
(Gay, et al., 2006, p. 113).  Because the study was qualitative in nature, initial individuals 
from the sample organizations were selected using qualitative sampling based on their 
ability to become “key informants” (Gay, et al., 2006, p. 113).  From the initial 
qualitative sample of individuals, a snowball sampling technique was employed to 
discover additional perspectives for the study. 
The initial government and industry institutions selected for this study include the 
Federal Aviation Administration (http://www.faa.gov) as the regulatory branch of the 
government handling aviation, the Joint Planning and Development Office 
(http://www.jpdo.gov) which is responsible for the development of the standards used for 
the NextGen air traffic control system, the Department of Defense (http://www.dod.mil) 
which is one of several federal agencies actively participating with the JPDO in NextGen 
development, the Department of Transportation (http://www.dot.gov) which provides 
research to the FAA regarding NextGen technologies, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association (http://www.aopa.org) which represents the interests of thousands of both 
pilots and aircraft owners, and L-3 Communications (http://www.L-3com.com) which 
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has multiple divisions providing advanced NextGen compatible avionics and systems to 
both general and commercial aviation. 
The selection of this purposive sample is important because each selected 
organization had a different perspective on the issues representing implementation, 
regulation, design, manufacturing, pilots, and owners; and each group had its own 
resources to interpret the proposed standards for the NextGen Active Network.  Although 
the organizations were geographically disparate, their perspectives were all important.  
From the initial organizations selected, a snowball sampling technique was used to 
determine other specific individuals and/or additional organizations with information 
pertinent to this study. The sample size for the study was determined by the number of 
participants whose organizations would formally approve participation.  Although six 
formal interviews were successfully completed for this study, several additional 
interested resources were located within organizations but were unable to obtain the 
required organization approvals and could therefore not participate in the study. 
Accessibility was a secondary consideration given to these selections in 
conducting the study.  The researcher has existing relationships with members of several 
organizations and made contact with the correct management personnel to insure 
feasibility.  The researcher had access to engineering and technical personnel in offices 
pertinent to this study, and was allowed access to any other person or office that the 
researcher determined to be a viable contributor within the organizations.   
The sample size for the study was determined by identifying “participants who 
meet the defined criterion” and selecting “a group of five or so participants to collect data 
from” (Gay, et al., 2006, p.115).  The determination to utilize five or more participants 
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was retained as a minimum and additional participants were identified and recruited until 
this criteria was exceeded. 
The selection of participants was critical to the success of this study.  The quality 
of interview based research is directly related to the expertise of the participants.  For this 
study, experts were selected based on their experience, education, and technical expertise 
within the aviation data communications realm.  Several of the members qualified in 
multiple areas with experience in air traffic control, aviation communications, and 
computer science.  Table 5 illustrates the diversity of the study sample.  Please note that 
the participant numbers have been removed and information presented in random order to 
insure the anonymity of the participants. 
Table 5. 
Participants by Discipline and Market Segment 
Discipline 
Market 
Segment Aviation 
Avionics 
ADS-B Academia
Computer 
Science 
█ █ █ █ Commercial 
█    Government 
█ █  █ Commercial 
█ █   Commercial 
█ █   Commercial 
█ █  █ Government 
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Instrumentation and Procedures 
 The instruments used in this study were questionnaires or interview guide.  The 
rationale behind selecting these instruments was the depth of data, the ability to ask 
questions that could not be effectively structured into a multiple-choice format, the 
flexibility of interaction, the likelihood of more accurate and honest responses, and the 
ability to follow up on questions that one-on-one interviews produce (Gay, et al., 2006, p. 
173).  A standardized questionnaire was developed (see Appendix C) and used to conduct 
all interviews included in the study.  The questionnaire was piloted by both academic and 
industry personnel prior to initial interviews. 
 Interviews were conducted with key people at each institution to solicit 
overall answers to the research questions.  To enhance validity and reduce bias within the 
interviews, a series of consistent steps were followed.  The steps used for each interview 
are shown in Table 6.  The purpose of conducting these interviews was to extract the 
richest possible information from sources with pertinent understanding of the airborne 
and ground-based network links utilized for ADS-B transmissions within the proposed 
NextGen air traffic control system.  The selection of a purposive sample requires that 
“qualitative researchers who use these techniques must provide detailed information 
about research participants and how they were chosen (Gay, et al., 2006, p.114) 
 
 42
Table 6. 
Interview Procedures 
Step Procedure 
Introduction The topic of the study and researcher was introduced to each 
participant.  The Interview Question Guide was made 
available for review by the participant and/or organization. 
Research Approval 
Documentation 
Executed Organization Approval letter and Informed Consent 
Form are collected from the participant. 
Interview Setup Specific times and locations were selected for the interview to 
minimize interruptions and background noise.  Fresh batteries 
were installed in the digital voice recorder, and the recorder 
was checked to insure that adequate free space for the 
complete interview was available. 
Interview The interview consisted of asking each of the 18 questions 
within Section A and Section B of the Interview Question 
Guide, in sequence, to each participant.  Participants were 
allowed to take whatever time they felt necessary to answer 
each question completely, and when appropriate, follow-up 
questions were asked to clarify their response.  Acronyms and 
technical terms used by the participants were confirmed to 
avoid misunderstanding.  Written notes were also taken by the 
researcher to highlight key responses and allow for follow-up 
questions or external confirmation through literature review.  
A bio was obtained from each participant. 
Post Interview Immediately following the interview, Section C was 
completed by the researcher to insure that the digital 
recordings could be correlated to biographical information 
from each participant for internal use.  The recording was then 
transferred to a secure server where it was later accessed to 
transcribe the interview into a Microsoft Word document. 
 
The study was designed to insure the trustworthiness of answers by conducting 
interviews over several months to compare differing responses.  Digital recordings and 
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field notes were used during each interview.  Triangulation was used to supplement 
interviews by reviewing available documents from each organization. 
Data Analysis 
 The data collected for this study consisted of multiple elements including each 
participant’s education and career background, organizational affiliation, current position 
held, and availability.  Each interview was recorded using a digital audio recording 
device, which was then transferred to a secure server for storage, transcription, and 
analysis.  The recordings were transcribed into their literal written form using Microsoft 
Word.  Notes and observations were also stored from each interview and utilized as 
additional data.  Transcribed data were then coded, compared, and synthesized for 
placement into categories in order to answer the research questions designed for the 
study.   
In addition to manual coding and analysis, both audio and transcribed interview 
data, internal and external literature resources, scanned images and graphics were loaded 
into NVivo version 8 software for secondary analysis and confirmation of manual results.  
While NVivo has powerful capabilities, it requires a significant amount of training to be 
most effective.  The E-project developed by this study using NVivo was not fully 
exploited due to the researcher’s limited experience with the product and the overall 
timeframe allotted for NVivo training and use.  Subsequent qualitative studies by the 
researcher will more effectively be able to utilize the software to produce additional 
reports and diagrams not included in this study.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
FINDINGS 
Introduction 
 The findings for this study have been developed from over a hundred pages of 
interview transcripts taken from six NextGen stakeholders who ranged from government 
program managers to avionics engineers, computer scientists, and aviation consultants.  
The study was designed to identify and understand the risks inherent to the proposed 
implementation of the active network within the ADS-B portion of the NextGen air 
traffic control system and compare the enterprise architecture against current standards 
and best practices in computer network security.  Each stakeholder brought his or her 
own unique perspective to the problem at hand as it applies to aviation, avionics, and 
network security.   
A comparative risk analysis against existing security standards was performed.  
The cross-pollination of information between multiple perspectives, as demonstrated in 
Table 5 and Table 7, provided a unique depth and enhanced the inductive nature of 
qualitative research (Gay, et al., 2006, p. 402).
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Sample Depth of Knowledge 
 To balance the need for richness of information against the requirements to 
maintain participants’ anonymity, the background of the participants was presented in a 
manner to avoid correlation with questionnaire responses. The order of presentation for 
background information and questionnaire responses has been purposely altered to 
further mask the individual’s characteristics.  Table 7 summarizes the depth of 
knowledge of the participants for this study. 
Table 7. 
Depth of Knowledge of Participants 
Areas of Expertise Background 
Aviation, Avionics, 
Computer Science, 
Consulting, 
Academia 
This participant has worked as a technical consultant for over 
10 years, holds Master’s and Doctoral degrees in Computer 
Science from Oxford, is a Rhodes scholar, and a founding 
participant in two groups which have been awarded the Collier 
Trophy.  The participant is a subject matter expert in ADS-B 
and currently a member of IEEE, RTCA, and ICAO ADS-B 
industry standards committees.  Prior positions span nearly 30 
years and include research manager, project manager, vice-
president, president, and assistant professor. 
Aviation, Operations, 
Systems 
Management, 
Defense, Space 
Operations, Security 
The participant was a high ranking military officer who holds a 
Bachelor’s degree from the Air Force Academy, a Master’s in 
Systems Management, has served in several capacities for 
Space Command, the Pentagon, the U.S. Senate, and is 
currently a director with oversight responsibilities for net-
centric operations at a federal agency. 
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Areas of Expertise Background 
Aviation, Avionics, 
Computer Science 
The participant has worked as an engineer for multiple 
commercial organizations in aviation, avionics, and remotely 
piloted vehicles for over 25 years. The participant holds 
Bachelor’s degrees in Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Science, and holds multiple patents surrounding TCAS, Mode 
S, ADS-B, RF, and surveillance technologies.  The participant 
is currently a senior staff engineer for a commercial avionics 
manufacturer. 
Aviation, Avionics, 
Rulemaking 
The participant holds Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in 
Engineering, has over 25 years of experience in the aviation 
industry, and is considered an expert in surveillance systems 
(ADS-B, TCAS, TAWS), data communication systems 
(ACARS, CMU), and flight management systems.  The 
participant is currently a member of multiple ADS-B industry 
standards groups and the ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee.  The participant is presently technical senior staff 
for a commercial avionics manufacturer. 
Aviation, Avionics 
The participant holds a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical 
Engineering and has worked in avionics development for 
multiple commercial entities for over 28 years in the 
development of RF systems including TCAS, transponder, 
VOR and ADF.  The participant is also an FAA System and 
Equipment DER, and is currently a senior engineer at an 
avionics company providing equipment for the initial rollout of 
ADS-B in the air freight industry. 
Aviation, Security, 
Information Systems, 
Project Management 
The participant is a noted information security specialist who 
holds a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering and has 
over 25 years of progressive security design and 
implementation experience including designs for Olympic 
venues, the Air Force, the State Department, the HSPD-12 
initiative, and other large-scale security implementations.  The 
participant has been employed in both commercial and federal 
market segments, but currently acts as a division chief and 
subject matter expert over infrastructure protection for a 
federal research facility providing thought leadership to 
multiple federal agencies. 
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Confidentiality 
Participant #1 
 Based on background and experience, Participant #1 indicated that there are 
published standards for ADS-B communications between aircraft and between aircraft 
and the ground so that anyone with an appropriate receiver and a standard decoder can 
listen in and figure out precisely what the aircraft are transmitting.  The participant 
synopsized his or her perspective of confidentiality within NextGen ADS-B 
transmissions by stating “For that part of the network, absolutely no security.”  
Participant #1 went on to elaborate that the rationale behind the lack of confidentiality “is 
by design intended to be heard by receivers because there is not only the air to ground 
aspect for classical ATC control, but there is also the air to air applications from pure 
situational awareness and eventually spacing and delegated separation.”   
In order for NextGen to perform its’ intended mission of providing air traffic 
control, every aircraft must be able to receive information from other aircraft in their 
vicinity whether directly or via a ground based transceiver.  The participant highlighted 
this need by stating “In our air space, particularly in our highest density air space, it must 
not be a secret that an aircraft is close to you”, and continued that “it absolutely should 
not be a secret that I am converging on you two miles away on a collision course.”  The 
participant completed the discussion of confidentiality with an outline of existing 
regulations which have been in place for over 30 years for all aircraft flying within civil 
airspace which must, by rule, be equipped with a transponder that can respond to TCAS 
security issues.   
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The participant highlighted the differences between confidentiality and anonymity 
within the NextGen ADS-B transmissions by adding that the UAT link currently provides 
for an anonymous mode of operation similar to squawking 1200 on a legacy transponder 
by saying  
…there is great disagreement, differing views around the world as to whether the 
anonymous address should be usable; and a number of ICAO contracting states 
would never permit it to be used period.  They understand that the United States 
has a situation in which they have 200,000 general aviation aircraft and, perhaps, 
a different political situation with regard to the way that the privacy laws are and 
that the airspace is regulated – but they do not want that anonymous feature used 
in their airspace. 
The participant later returned to the confidentiality aspect of the study and reiterated their 
perspective by stating  
I think I have articulated that the air ground segment should not be changed, and I 
have given a number of reasons that it should not from a security perspective.  It 
is a broadcast system.  It is intended to be in the clear just like the GPS signals 
are.  We should no more encrypt or provide other shielding mechanisms for 
broadcasts out of aircraft than we should reinstate selective availability on GPS 
that is off by presidential policy directive and has been since August of 2000.  So 
we have moved past the argument with regard to GPS, and we should not create 
an argument that we will later need to move past for ADS-B aircraft 
transmissions. 
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Participant #2 
 Participant #2 indicated that “the envisioned net enabled operations architecture 
has not yet been instantiated.”  The participant continued to elaborate that “A major 
design element is enterprise level, multi-layered security that governs information 
exchange, thus preventing unauthorized disclosure.”  When discussing limits to 
confidentiality within NextGen, Participant #2 believed that the NextGen net enabled 
operations architecture envisioned “right data, right user, right time”, and that data will be 
protected to the appropriate degree, as determined by the subject matter experts operating 
under the auspices of a Community of Interest.   
Although this participant’s comments speak to the future potential of the NextGen 
networks, the comments also highlight the possibility of initially fielding hardware and 
software solutions that may be forced to change as security issues are identified in 
implementation.  This common concern was also expressed by several other participants 
in the study. 
Participant #3 
 Participant #3 confirmed that confidentiality is not currently designed into the 
NextGen network, stating that “ADS-B information is sent on a particular RF channel per 
industry standards, with a particular modulation and there is no encryption.”  The 
participant spoke to the relative complexity of the receiving the ADS-B messages stating 
“someone would have to know how to build the correct equipment and then 
receive it and decode the address.  The address field is a parity field, so you would 
have to decode that to find out if you wanted to know, like a particular mode S 
address for a particular airplane – and then you could get the data.  I mean, but 
 50
you would have to go to some means, some technical means, in order to be able to 
receive and get the data.  You know, if they are independent of the avionics 
industry that is using the equipment. 
The bottom line to this participant’s perspective on confidentiality within ADS-B was 
summed up in stating “The other airplanes need the information, right?  That is to prevent 
collisions – that is the whole point.” 
Participant #4 
 Participant #4 outlined the confidentiality components within the NextGen Active 
Network by commenting that  
The airborne, the air to ground segment, of course, is not – does not provide any 
kind of security; but when you get down to the ground infrastructure, they have 
all kinds of security measures they put into place when they are passing this 
information over a network” and continued that ADS-B messages are “not any 
communications between individuals that would require some kind of secure 
communications that you are trying to keep information from getting into the 
wrong hands.  
The participant compared the proposed NextGen system with the security risks of 
existing technology in stating that  
When you look it from what exactly you are trying to do here, you are basically 
trying to control aircraft in a controlled environment; and today you use radar and 
there is not a lot of security that is up on radar – you are just painting an aircraft 
or you are receiving information that is coming from the same source that is going 
to provide you the ADS-B data, so it is all positional and you are just receiving it.  
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Now if you get into the automation and you start monkeying with the automation 
of what air traffic control is using, then yeah, I could see where there could be an 
issue there—but you certainly can receive the information and listen to it all day 
long (if you would like).  They do that with ACARS today. 
This participant did not view the public nature of the current NextGen data as a threat, 
unless “if there is a specific aircraft they are trying to find, then there might be an issue 
there.” 
Participant #5 
 Participant #5 indicated that proposed model for the NextGen network does not 
require confidentiality by stating that the network uses  
…public standards, and anybody can listen.  There is no encryption or anything 
like that.  Now there is a military format, which nobody is using to my knowledge 
that does have encryption.  Military ADS-B – it is called the F19; but it, to my 
knowledge, it is not being used. 
The participant continued, stating that “I mean – you have the terrorist aspect, which 
obviously is a problem.  I suppose somebody could do bad stuff if they were intelligent 
enough to, but I do not… I have not thought about specific threats or anything like that.” 
 The participant also indicated that the current reasons to broadcast information in 
the clear because “ADS-B has to be, I mean the airplanes, the air vehicles and ground 
stations both have to receive the data.  If you could encrypt so, you know, the desired 
users can use it but other people could not, that would probably be good to do, but that is 
how it is set up today.” 
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Participant #6 
 Participant #6 indicated that  
In the air, it is broadcast in the clear.  It is basically because the current system is 
the same way – everything is in the clear.  So if you have your own equipment 
and know how to interpret it, you can understand what is going on.  And because 
it is a worldwide system, that they need to keep it in the clear.  To get everyone on 
the same page is extremely difficult if you go encryption or things of that nature. 
The participant elaborated on NextGen confidentiality by stating that “What is different 
with ADS-B now is aircraft talk to each other.  They are not actually having a 
conversation, like a session, like ground infrastructure does; but instead of relaying 
through the ground, it can go from plane to plane now.  So it kind of happens on the 
ground AND in the air.”   
The participant completed the initial discussion on confidentiality by adding that 
the data will eventually be publicly accessible  
…if they get clearance; and there is a process to go through; and part of 
the ADS-B program is actually to help reduce costs by providing that data.  There 
are all kinds of ways to filter it and delay it.  Like now, right now – there are 
systems out there now that provide that data.  Not in the detail, but they are all 
delayed. 
Later in the interview, Participant #6 returned to the discussion on confidentiality 
and added a comparison between ADS-B transmissions and traditional computer 
networks by stating that some would call the NextGen Active Network “like your home 
network, but that is not what it is.  You are not holding a conversation.  You are just 
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listening.  It is strictly broadcast.”  The participant outlined the differences between ADS 
–B and a computer VPN connection by stating “Right, and that is the session – an IP 
session where now you have a tunnel into the system that no one knows about, and they 
cannot do that with this.”  The participant closed out the thought with a statement that 
“When people call it wireless, most people think of their home network or that thing at 
Starbucks or whatever; and that is not what it is.” 
Table 8 summarizes the perspectives of all participants regarding confidentiality. 
Table 8. 
Perspective Synopsis: Confidentiality 
Perspective 
“Confidentiality does not apply to ADS-B.  It is a broadcast system.” 
“…envisions right data, right user, right time” 
“…there is no encryption” 
ADS-B messages do not “require some kind of secure communications that you are 
trying to keep information from getting into the wrong hands” 
“If you could encrypt so… the desired users can use it but other people could not that 
would probably be good to do.” 
“To get everyone on the same page is extremely difficult if you go encryption or things 
of that nature.” 
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Integrity 
Participant #1 
 Participant #1 believed that NextGen “does not take specific measures to protect 
against spoofing or harmful intended interference”, but added that “there are significant 
measures in the system to provide high integrity of data going through the ether, through 
normal interference.”  The participant went on to describe the methodologies used by 
each of the two link technologies proposed for NextGen.  For the UAT link which uses 
Forward Error Correction, if a packet “decodes correctly and passes at FEC” the 
likelihood of receiving a bad packet “would not be the case for more than 1:100,000,000 
messages.”  For the 1090-ES link which uses legacy technology in the form of a Cyclic 
Redundancy Check, the participant stated that “you would have a loss of integrity of no 
more than 1:1,000,000 messages.”  The participant contrasted this with current Mode 
A/C transponders that are at best 1:1,000 packets, but asked “is the ATC system unsafe 
because of this?  No, because you get a lot of responses and you do not take drastic ATC 
action because of any one return from a Mode A/C transponder or basically the ADS-B 
system or from the radar.” 
 Participant #1 stated that “there is no authentication required” in the proposed 
implementation of ADS-B in NextGen.  The participant clarified this in that “they are not 
authenticated at all in the sense that I have to authenticate you before I will talk to you or 
before I will pay attention to your information”.  The cooperative manner in which ADS-
B tracks aircraft suggests that ignoring a message packet from a non-authenticated 
aircraft could have disastrous consequences.  The participant concluded his discussion of 
proposed ADS-B authentication by illustrating:  
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Let us just think about that – and we are certainly not going to take that off the 
screen because we think that somebody messed up when they installed the 24-bit 
code into the Mode S transponder of the aircraft.  We do not say that is in invalid 
code, therefore that aircraft must not exist.  That is not going to happen.  There is 
no authentication protocol at all by the ground system, nor should there be.  You 
want to know that guy is there, and if there is a mistake in what he is 
broadcasting, if something is wrong, you want to figure out what it is, and when 
he lands write him up. 
Participant #2 
Participant #2 believed that NextGen aircraft, ground station, and satellite 
transmissions authentication should be considered sensitive information and could not 
comment on methods employed to insure integrity. 
Participant #3 
 Participant #3 discussed NextGen’s ability to guard against existing improper 
modification or destruction of information in transit stating  
I do not know how you would do that.  I mean, the messages – again, are assigned 
this 24-bit address associated with a particular aircraft, and then you use that 
information to determine where he is at.  I do not know how you would intercept 
in real time the actual modulation that is going out in space and modify it.  That 
would be difficult to do because just as soon as you change a bit in the data field 
per the MOPS now, per our standard, industry standard; as soon as you would 
change a bit in the data field, it would affect the 24-bit parity bits associated with 
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the address.  So the encoding would be wrong, so you would throw that message 
away. 
The participant also expanded on the CRC included in each ADS-B message 
stating that  
The last 24 bits of the messages are encoded.  In the case of ADS-B messages, I 
think they are all 1’s – and I think the way the 24-bit address works, then the 
actual aircraft Mode S address is part of the data field; but it is still encoded, so if 
you encoded a bit—let us say you changed a bit in the message, then you would 
have to know also to be able to intercept exactly at the right point in time when it 
is received, the 24-bit parity and make sure that it encodes with the data as all 1’s.   
The participant doubted the likelihood that data integrity could be compromised 
in practice, stating “It would be pretty difficult to do.” 
Participant #4 
 Participant #4 believed that the transmission methodologies and error correction 
techniques used in the airborne portion of the NextGen Active Network would make it 
difficult to modify or destroy information on the fly stating that  
I do not think there is anything in the airborne side to modify, other than you 
could potentially go up, and you could be a jamming type of thing where you 
could transmit a lot of 1090’s to the point where the reception and rate would be 
dropped way down, and you may end up not being able to receive all of the 
transmissions, 
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and that the ensuing packet overload could create a “denial of service” effect on ADS-B.  
This would be most likely within “the 1090 spectrum, that is an issue in some of the high-
density areas where you have a lot of aircraft flying, and they are all transmitting.”  The 
participant also confirms the dependence on the 24-bit parity CRC method of insuring 
data integrity by stating that “Parity is really about the only thing that is available.” 
 Participant #4 discussed the issue of authentication within ADS-B by stating “I do 
not think we try to really authenticate that it is coming from that aircraft, if you are 
talking air to air – all we are trying to do is a surveillance kind of information.”  The 
participant continued to describe ADS-B authentication and a vendor specific 
enhancement correlating ADS-B and TCAS data by stating that  
There is a sort of authentication from the standpoint that the position that is being 
reported via ADS-B is the correct position.  We do that kind of authentication, 
and we have TCAS.  TCAS is an independent system from ADS-B so if you are 
within TCAS range (and we do this), we will actually go out there and validate 
that the position that is coming in is the correct position.  If it is not, then we have 
ways of handling that traffic.  
The participant elaborates on the collaboration of air to air message traffic by describing 
the tracking methodology used as:  
Those are all fixed broadcast messages that we can receive.  So we receive 
that information, and we establish a track to start tracking.  Before we take 
a report and add it to the track that we are tracking the aircraft on, we have 
a means of using TCAS because we are including ADS-B end function in 
with the TCAS system; the reason being, of course, is that they both use 
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1090 reception, a simple way of putting the systems together.  So we now 
can take the capability of the TCAS to interrogate the transponder in that 
other aircraft, so the transponder is sending me an ADS-B message; but 
also with TCAS, I can interrogate that transponder and get a reply back; 
and based on that reply, I can determine its position and relative bearing.  
So based on that relative bearing and range from my aircraft, I can do a 
comparison against the reported position to see, and knowing what my 
position is, I can determine whether that position is valid.  My equipment 
will say – oh, that guy is not what this guy is, so there is no correlating 
between those two.  So I have got a couple of options.  One is:  I can either 
throw the data out if it is just spurious; or if it seems to be bogus.  Because 
my TCAS system is going to keep me safe in the environment, and if I 
have not validated that that guy is providing me good information, then I 
am not going to use him in any of the applications.  Like, for example, if I 
am doing some kind of spacing application, ADS-B application, I am 
going to validate the information using that TCAS if that is correct; and if 
he is validated, then I will use him for that application.  And then, of 
course, there is information that is also provided from, in the transmission 
itself, that is going to tell me the integrity of the data that is being 
transmitted as well. 
 Participant #4 was also aware of the methods in place for insuring ground station 
integrity, which was described as “a multi-sensor tracker in the ground infrastructure that 
receives surveillance information from several sources – from the radar…..from the 
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secondary surveillance radar, from multilateration, and then I think there is a fusion that 
takes place; and then they do some kind of integrity based on knowing the latency of 
receiving the data, transmitting the data, all that.” 
 To complete the discussion on data integrity, Participant #4 described methods of 
insuring the integrity of GPS satellite transmissions in that  
Here you have the GPS system, you have the modem, transponder that is 
transmitting, and then you have your application sitting somewhere that is 
receiving this data like that map you were talking about.  Well see, it is going to 
look at all of this information the GPS is creating in terms of the integrity and the 
accuracy, and it will use that to determine whether the information is good enough 
to be able to use for that application.  And so that, in a sense, is sort of how you 
authenticate at the end of where you are trying to use this…..the data itself for a 
particular application. 
Participant #5 
 Participant #5 believed that the design for the ADS-B portion of the NextGen 
Active Network is designed to provide security with “…integrity built in.  There is a 24-
bit CRC built into the message that has a probability of detection or probability of false 
detection of 10-6, I believe, or better.  So it does have that built in.”  The participant 
continued by including other existing methods stating “There are other things, too, that if 
the data is really off, it will not be accepted for other reasons, like it transmits latitude, 
longitude—well, if you receive something for halfway around the world, you know it is 
hosed up because it is a line of sight, 200- to 300-mile system.  And there are other things 
that you can look at in the data to show it is unreasonable.” 
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 In outlining their perspective regarding authentication of ADS-B aircraft 
transmissions, Participant #5 stated that “If you get a spurt of single transmission or 
transmissions that the data is vastly inconsistent, then you know there is a problem, but 
no, you could if you were a terrorist, you could, if you look at that scenario, you could 
build a little transmitter and put it up at” a local airport.  The participant also mentioned 
an interesting sidelight to the 24-bit ICAO addressing scheme which is individualized to 
each equipped airframe, noting that the present system does not utilize the information in 
stating “Any 24 bits would do – other than all zeros and all ones (those are illegal)—but 
you have 224 - 2 different combinations they can choose.” 
Participant #6 
 Participant #6 discussed the designed-in fallback methods within the airborne 
network to insure data integrity by stating that  
…they have it back into the back end that they have processes in place because 
they tie what is coming over the air plus secondary surveillance radar – time 
difference of arrival, and they usually receive different sensors, and they use 
multilateration so that helps.  So if someone is trying to spoof, that will come out.  
They will identify there is issues going on. 
The participant also outlined the evolution of security that will occur as NextGen 
is deployed  
They need a back-up system, you know – and this can change over time, but not 
everyone can equip on day 1, so they need to keep all these systems in place on 
the long term.  And then as equipage goes up, then they can readdress; but there 
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will always be a back-up system of some type.  You know the intent is for SSR to 
always remain in place or some type of backup. 
 Table 9 summarizes the perspectives of all participants regarding integrity. 
Table 9. 
Perspective Synopsis: Integrity 
Perspective 
CRC and FEC insure integrity of 1:1,000,000 and 1:100,000,000 respectively.  “No 
authentication is required.” 
“That is sensitive” 
Tampering “would affect the 24-bit parity bits associated with the address” 
“Parity is really about the only thing that is available.”           “…if you are within TCAS 
range (and we do this), we will actually go out there and validate that the position that is 
coming in is the correct position.” 
“There is a 24-bit CRC built into the message that has a probability of detection or 
probability of false detection of 10-6” 
NextGen will “…tie what is coming over the air plus secondary surveillance radar – 
time difference of arrival, and they usually receive different sensors, and they use 
multilateration.” 
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Availability 
Participant #1 
 The participant agreed that it is critical for ADS-B network to insure timely and 
reliable access to navigational and control information, and stated that  
We have designed the ground infrastructure for a maximum latency from time of 
receipt of a message that should trigger a report  at the service delivery point; and 
ITT is under very clear design goals there in terms of maximum time it takes, and 
they are meeting those goals.  On the aircraft side, we have a requirement that was 
in the NPRM, and in a modified form, will be in the final rule on the maximum 
uncompensated latency, uncompensatable latency from the position source via 
GPS or something else to the transmission of the ADS-B information out of the 
aircraft - so timeliness is very important; and there are specific requirements, both 
in the air and on the ground, to insure it. 
 Several methods of improving potential ADS-B availability against malicious or 
intentional interference were mentioned by the participant.  The potential techniques to 
mitigate spoofing within ADS-B mentioned by the participant include using message 
timestamps to verify distance, triangulation or multilateration of ADS-B messages 
between multiple ground-stations to verify approximate location, and fusing ADS-B 
message data with existing radar returns to correlate ADS-B and radar signals and 
eliminate spurious message traffic.  The participant concluded that triangulation and 
multilateration techniques require ground systems which will initially only occur in high 
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density areas, but the risk increase with traffic and low density areas by definition have 
lower traffic and thereby reduced risk. 
Conversely, the participant discussed the potential use of the same multilateration, 
triangulation, or fusing ADS-B and radar data techniques to insure adequate availability.  
The participant described multilateration as “a technique where the ground infrastructure 
itself, without secondary surveillance backup” could verify the validity of signals, and 
suggested its’ potential to “of course, also catch spoofers.”  Regarding early testing of the 
technique, the participant remarked “No decision has been made, but one place that a 
serious look has been taken is in the Gulf of Mexico, where we hope to get early 
operational benefits out of the use of ADS-B – but need to validate ADS-B to insure that 
we have enough integrity in the non-radar airspace.” 
Participant #2 
 Participant #2 agreed that availability “is part of the vision” for the ADS-B 
portion of the NextGen Active Network to insure that availability by preventing 
disruptions from intentional and unintentional sources of interference.  The participant 
also concurred that it is critical for ADS-B to insure the timely and reliable access to 
navigation and control information as part of that vision.  The participant also stated that 
“Today there are many gaps between current networks and the net enabled operational 
environment envisioned by NextGen” and recommended that the “Implementation of a 
service oriented architecture with enterprise level security” be utilized to eliminate 
existing security gaps. 
Participant #3 
Participant #3 discussed availability by stating that  
 64
There is an industry standard function called hybrid surveillance, which has been 
released (I forget the DO number of the RTCA document), but it has been 
released.  What it does, if you are a TCAS system, you can interrogate and get a 
range with secondary surveillance.  You can then compare that range to the 
calculated differential range that you get when you look at your lat/long and the 
lat/long of the interrogated aircraft from an ADS-B transmission.  Again, his 
lat/long and your lat/long if you know the distance – so you can compare the 
interrogated range to that range and see if it is within a certain boundary that 
would qualify it as a threat.  And so, in that way, we can check that the 
information sort of makes sense. 
Participant #3 discussed the potential of interfering with NextGen by broadcasting 
ADS-B messages for non-existent aircraft by stating  
You might, for instance, send traffic with a lat/long, and maybe what you are 
getting at is - someone else could send out traffic with a different lat/long to show 
that someone is there that is not there, I guess.  I am not sure what kind of a 
problem would result from that, even if that were to happen, because…  Okay, so 
you are going to see some additional airplanes out there. 
The participant injected that hybrid surveillance would eliminate the threat, because “if 
that is going on, someone could direction-find the guy where he is and shut him down.  
So, hey, by the time he made his threat and maintained interference, someone would find 
him.”   
Participant #3 also stated that spoofing would be reduced or eliminated based on 
software within their systems which correlate ADS-B and TCAS transmissions.  The 
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participant stated that “it is doing a secondary surveillance range.  This guy says he is at 
this range.  I am interrogating him, and nobody is answering.”  The NextGen system’s 
ability to eliminate the uncorrelated information would prevent bad data from effecting 
flight paths. 
Participant #3 summed up their perspective on NextGen availability by stating 
that:  
If you are talking about, say tracking another airplane, it is a constant update; so 
we are looking for data each second using that form where we call tracks – and so 
the data has to be continually there in order to maintain a track.  So, you can 
speculate about all kinds of disruption, but I mean, that is how it works.  For 
instance, if you lose data for two or three scans in a row, two or three seconds in a 
row; you are still going to maintain a track; and even if the data’s coming through 
intermittently you will filter and associate with that 24-bit address – and you will 
maintain and track for that aircraft.  So some amount of loss of data can occur and 
still maintain a track.  I guess that is the positive side. 
Participant #4 
 Participant #4 did not believe that the proposed NextGen network insures 
availability by preventing disruptions from intentional or unintentional interference, and 
stated “Other than just the check of the data that is being transmitted; there is nothing, I 
do not think, that really prevents the interference, unintentional interference that I am 
aware of.  And again, I am just talking about the 1090 link.”  The participant elaborated 
on how the airborne network links were developed commenting that  
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The way ADS-B came about is an evolution, if you will.  With the secondary 
surveillance radar and how that works, which was an evolutionary replacement of 
the primary radar that was doing the painting.  Now you have secondary 
surveillance, which now takes advantage of the transponder that is on the aircraft.  
It can interrogate that transponder or transponder reply; and it will, of course, give 
you a position or relative position in data.  That used two sets of frequencies, 
1030 and 1090, specific frequencies.  The 1030 was used as the interrogation; 
1090 is the frequency that you replied on.  And so, the evolution continued; and 
now we got into ADS-B, and we said….Ah, well; we have a transponder on the 
aircraft.  All we have to do is hook up a couple of positional sources, and now we 
can transmit its position on a broadcast basis; and we will use the 1090 
transmission that is already on the aircraft. 
 Additional elaboration by Participant #4 outlined a secondary concern in the 
selection of the 1090-ES data link and stated “It is a single channel, right, because 
everybody is broadcasting.  Of course, with the mode S transponder, everybody has an 
address; and so there are mechanisms to go up and, based on interrogations, you can have 
one call and get everybody to reply; or you can communicate just directly with one 
aircraft or another; but you are only using that one frequency.”  The participant later 
continued this train of thought and added that  
The ARC has come up with, some of the concerns that they have are around how 
much 1090 transmissions are occurring.  Single channel, you have lot of 
transmissions out there, so you could get into a saturation point at high-volume 
airports.  You get into a saturation point, and then; so what begins to do is the 
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acceptable rate of receiving information starts to go down; your range of receiving 
information goes down; and ultimately, you get to a point where your reception 
rate is… you cannot do anything with it.  So that is a potential problem.  I mean, it 
is even a potential problem of somebody not trying to do it but just because of the 
virtue of too much traffic on a single frequency trying to do too much.  But, of 
course, the industry is looking at ways of at least trying to resolve that situation. 
The participant also explored potential solutions to the problem and explained that  
There are some technologies that are going forward.  We have some technology 
that we can offer, but there are things that they can do to go in and reduce, that 
could get rid of secondary surveillance radar.  They could go to hybrid 
surveillance; use hybrid surveillance, which is melding TCAS and ADS-B, so 
there are things that can be done to reduce that. 
Participant #5 
 Participant #5 noted that the proposed NextGen Active Network does not insure 
availability from intentional or unintentional interference by stating that “if somebody 
wanted to jam it, they could.  It is not like a spread spectrum type of thing where it is 
anti-jam resistant.”  The participant also commented on the criticality of timely and 
reliable network access and stated that “a lot of the applications are, you know, time 
sensitive.  …some of our other applications are merging spacing, so the data has to be 
received within a timely manner, or else you are not going to get valid data.  There are 
specifications in the MOPS that say you have to generate a report within a certain length 
of time after receiving it, so there are requirements to ensure you have adequate latency.” 
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Participant #6 
 Participant #6 asserted that NextGen transmissions will maintain availability 
through the same authentication methods now in use which they described as “the same 
kind of error checking that we just talked about is generally how that is done right now” 
and “There are flight plans in place, so there is a procedure that is going on now that is 
going to stay, and that is taken into consideration when they are comparing messages 
they are getting and secondary radar inputs.  That is how they discover the 
inconsistencies.” 
 Participant #6 continued the discussion of availability by asserting that the FAA 
regulations  
…have the procedures in place that if that happens, they revert to the way they do 
business now.  I mean – if someone jams something, they have to just find the 
source.  They know that as the equipment evolves, it is going to be able to deal 
with that stuff better, but it is usually most of the problems like that are dealt with 
by procedures.  ADS-B is not going to relieve the pilot of any of his duties, so he 
is still responsible to get the job done, even though there could be issues with it. 
While this does not provide assurance that the NextGen air traffic control system will 
remain constantly available, the participant highlighted the fact that there is a fallback 
plan which utilizes legacy methods and technologies to allow continued operations at 
current standards. 
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 Table 10 summarizes the perspectives of all participants regarding availability. 
Table 10. 
Perspective Synopsis: Availability 
Perspective 
“…timeliness is very important; and there are specific requirements, both in the air and 
on the ground, to insure it.” 
“Today there are many gaps between current networks and the net enabled operational 
environment envisioned by NextGen.” 
Air to air authentication is insured by hybrid surveillance. 
“…use hybrid surveillance, which is melding TCAS and ADS-B data” 
“It is not like a spread spectrum type of thing” 
Existing error checking, with a fallback to legacy flight procedures 
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Additional Comments 
Participant #1 
 Participant #1 remarked that industry, education, and government should improve 
their working relationships to address security assessments by stating that:  
This is an area that, on a government-wide basis, is very much open for 
improvement; and that improvement would rebound into the ADS-B 
ground infrastructure backhaul.  It has been very difficult for people who 
are implementing information services on the civil side of the government 
to get appropriate threat assessments, appropriate classification of data 
they are doing, and to know with confidence what they need to do.  Within 
each agency you tend to have, what I call security-niks; and whether or not 
there is a problem, we need better security to defeat the non-problem.  
This tends to obscure the fact that the people beating the drum are the 
special security-niks within the various agencies; tends to obscure the 
situation.  It tends to become a rice bowl issue as opposed to getting 
looked at strictly on the merits.  It is unfortunate that we have maneuvered 
ourselves into this situation.  Then if a responsible program manager such 
as the ADS-B program manager consults with NSA, it is not easy for 
NSA. 
Participant #1 acknowledged that the security-niks are clearly experts, but 
questioned whether they have the staff or the manpower to effectively respond to requests 
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for threat assessments.  “We need good threat assessments in terms of risks and 
exposures compared to risks and exposures that we take today.  We need more 
comparative security assessments than de novo, ground up, out of a book, security 
assessments.  We need to be able to take credit for the fact that we have been accepting a 
degree of risk and things have been going well -- and just look at how things are 
different, and to the degree they are different; take that into account in terms of increasing 
our security and privacy concerns.” 
Participant #2 
 Participant #2 recommended that NextGen “participate in COI activities and in 
data and standards related consortiums” to address the security needs of the industry and 
successfully feed the pipeline of intellectual capital.” 
Participant #3 
 Participant #3 compared the message standards employed by ADS-B to existing 
computer network standards and stated that  
If you look at the information rate associated with this system and try to apply 
Internet standards, there is a high degree of overhead on the data that is being 
transmitted.  We are already, because of the industry standards, we are already 
using almost all the bits for information and/or this 24-bit parity, so there are not a 
lot of bits left over to go do like a TCP/IP protocol with all that overhead, so you 
were asking is there a need for the overhead?  I guess my answer is that we are 
following the industry standards the way they are, and we have used all the 
information bits. 
 72
Participant #4 
 Participant #4 rejected the need for additional security within the airborne portion 
of the NextGen Active Network by stating that  
…again, this is based on my perspective; and I guess it would be depending on 
what the threat would be.  I guess, if I look at it from the standpoint that if I had a 
means to gather data and interject it into the system that could create havoc, then I 
would say yeah, you are probably at risk.  But as long as you have security to not 
allow that to happen, then the airborne side, I do not think, is going to require that.  
When we start going, and that is the air to ground, getting into the ATC 
automation.  When you are looking from air to air, as long as you have a way to 
validate or do that authentication that we were talking about before, then you are 
probably okay as well in terms of any threats that may happen.  But again, it 
would depend on the type, the threat that you are looking at specifically.  But 
based on the way I see things today and how they want to use it, I do not think 
there is a need for it. 
Participant #5 
 Participant #5 questioned the need for additional security within the airborne 
portion of the NextGen Active Network by stating that “it really was not built as a secure-
type link.  I mean, is it necessary?  I do not know.”  He/she added “… from a collision 
avoidance standpoint, it is not currently used for collision avoidance.  There is an 
independent system for that.  TCAS is independent” then completed the perspective by 
stating that “It is likely if somebody disrupted ADS-B, they are not likely going to cause 
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a collision if you have an airplane that is equipped with TCAS because that works 
independently of ADS-B and would detect that – so I am not sure how to answer that.”   
The participant’s recommendation to eliminate some of the security gaps includes 
merging ADS-B and TCAS data within airborne systems.  The participant described the 
potential benefits stating  
Our TCAS performs both the ADS-B end function as well as the collision 
avoidance function.  That does its own checking of ADS-B versus, you know, the 
secondary surveillance replies; so it, in fact, does that already, and TCAS uses 
secondary surveillance radar data, which has been deemed to be more accurate or 
more reliable than ADS-B data.  So that is already done for airborne systems if 
you have a TCAS.  The ground stations probably could do that, too, and should do 
that because most 1090/ADS-B systems are mode S transponders with an ADS-B 
function put in it, so it does both the secondary surveillance radar as well as ADS-
B.  So the ground station, radar ground stations definitely can and should 
authenticate or verify that both are within the tolerance of radar. 
Final comments from Participant #5 were directed at the rationale between the 
1090-ES and UAT platforms.  The participant stated that  
I do not think any of the OAMs are talking about equipping with UAT.  The, you 
know, transport airplanes.  The Boeing or Airbus, I do not think they are looking 
at UATs.  There are some things with UAT that do not make a lot of sense 
because if you are flying in IFR conditions, most places you have to have a 
transponder; so it does not make sense to have a transponder and a UAT system 
when you can have just the transponder that does ADS-B.  So there is some limit.  
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It is kind of not going to make a lot of sense in a lot of cases.  Why should you put 
a second system on your airplane when you can… Yeah, a lot of airplanes have 
just the ATCRBS transponders, which do not do ADS-B; but they can replace 
them with a mode S with additional cost. 
The participant stated that the 1090-ES system “does both instead of having two 
different systems and maybe two different antennas.”  The participant closed with a 
thought regarding 1090-ES versus UAT equipping for “as long as FAA is going to 
require secondary surveillance radar, which I think they are near term; then a lot of times, 
it just does not make sense to put in UAT.” 
Participant #6 
 Participant #6 took time to correlate the NextGen communications with existing 
FAA computer network standards and stated that  
FAA is very rigorous on their FISMA and going through SCAP for their ground 
infrastructure.  They are more regimented than, I think maybe DOD is worse, but 
that is about it.  They do a very good job, it is very diligent.  There is separation of 
roles and responsibilities.  I have done a lot of CNA work for DoT, FAA, and 
different places; and FAA is, just my experience, so far is the best one about 
getting it done correctly, consistently, and tracking it.  It is not a paper exercise. 
The participant then expanded the thought regarding computer network standards 
into the airborne portion of NextGen by stating that  
Because a lot of FISMA, when it ends up in the NIST requirements, the air to air 
it applies but it does not at the same time because you are not really creating 
communication sessions.  Most of FISMA is about creating a session and getting 
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in and doing damage, you know, get in and control the system; and in the air to 
air, you can spoof and jam, but you really cannot go in and modify things. 
The participant expanded on the discussion by adding “it is kind of like you are 
going under the power lines of the AM radio kind of thing.  You cause an issue with the 
signal, but you are not going to create damage to the system if everyone follows their 
procedures.” 
 Participant #6 briefly discussed the potential of using ADS-B as a targeting device 
for terrorism, and responded that “the issue with that is – you can do that now.  You do 
not need ADS-B.  People are bringing up all these creative ideas, but they do not realize 
that, just the information, it is already been out there.  It is just that ADS-B makes it more 
efficient.” 
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Thematic Analysis of Participants 
 The findings in this study involved the examination of the selected stakeholders’ 
input related to the research questions developed in Chapter 1 of: 
1. How does proposed ADS-B network design for the NextGen air traffic control 
system compare to government and commercial industry network security 
standards?   
2. How does the ADS-B portion of the proposed NextGen network design perform 
when faced with common computer network threats such as Denial of Service, 
Session Hijacking, and Network Eavesdropping?   
3. How does the ADS-B portion of the NextGen network model insure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability? 
and the Interview Question Guide shown in Appendix C.  The primary focus areas 
developed through a review of the literature include the three primary security objectives 
outlined in the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability. 
 Additional comments based on the participants’ unique perspectives which were 
either peripheral to or outside of the direct focus of this study were captured for direct 
application where possible and for potential future research where there less direct 
correlation occurred. 
Confidentiality 
 The participants’ opinions regarding the confidentiality capabilities and 
requirements within the ADS-B portion of the NextGen Active Network shared a number 
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of common themes.  Five of the participants, or 83% of the sample, noted that there is no 
encryption used in the airborne portion of the network and therefore anyone with a 
capable receiver may capture the information being transmitted in the clear.  Four of the 
participants, or 67% of the sample, commented that ADS-B transmissions are a broadcast 
medium as opposed to the handshake, session, or connection protocols utilized between 
transmitter and receiver within normal computer networks, and therefore should not be 
evaluated on the same criteria.  Three participants, or 50% of the sample, also mentioned 
that harmonization between U.S. and world standards would make the use of encryption 
to insure confidentiality problematic, as the distribution of shared keys or certificates to 
thousands of aircraft would be time consuming and difficult.  Two of the participants, or 
33% of the sample, also believed that it is the intent that aviation data only be released to 
the aviation community and not the world at large.  One participant summed up several 
comments which focused separately on flight safety by stating that the location of any 
aircraft in the National Air Space must not be a secret, therefore confidentiality was not 
necessary or desirable. 
 Additional comments surrounding confidentiality primarily surrounded a 
perceived need by some aircraft users for anonymity, which is provided in the UAT link, 
but not currently available under the 1090-ES standards.  In this case, confidentiality is 
not a security issue, but a privacy issue and does not fall within the purview of this study. 
Integrity 
 The participants also contributed similar information under themes surrounding 
data and network integrity.  Five of the participants, or 83% of the sample pointed to the 
CRC, FEC, and/or 24-bit parity methods built into the UAT and 1090-ES standards to 
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insure integrity.  Three of the five mentioned statistics indicating a maximum error rate 
for the UAT data link using FEC at 1:100,000,000 packets, and the error rate for the 
1090-ES data link using CRC at 1:1,000,000 packets. The sixth participant declined to 
comment on integrity as they deemed the topic too “sensitive” for this potentially public 
forum.  Three of the participants, or 50% of the sample, cited secondary surveillance 
methods of insuring data integrity including utilizing TCAS active ranging to verify 
ADS-B targets.  Three participants also highlighted the potential of using TDOA, 
multilateration, and other reasonableness checks to validate the integrity of inbound data; 
and discussed the algorithms used in GPS which are passed to ADS-B along with 
position data in the form of validity and integrity values. 
Three participants also mentioned that ADS-B was spoof-able, but that both 
aircraft and ground equipment should be able to sort out the real targets from bogus ones 
using SSR, TCAS, multilateration, triangulation, and/or fusing primary radar and ADS-B 
data to correlate sources.  Three other users commented on their belief that losing one or 
several ADS-B messages would not significantly impact the safety of the system, as 
messages are transmitted once every second and the onboard computer systems that 
manage the data develop a track for each aircraft based on multiple successful packets.  
Spurious messages would likely be discarded as out of range or non-correlated against 
other information sources. 
Availability 
 Common themes also emerged within the study of NextGen network availability.  
Four of the participants, or 67% of the sample, cited specific concerns regarding the 
vulnerability of ADS-B to Denial of Service attacks within the 1090-ES data link which 
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could be caused by increased traffic in high-density airspace such as the northeast 
corridor or at any of the major airports including Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, or 
Dallas-Fort Worth.  The same vulnerability could also be exploited by malicious sources, 
but either case could effectively hamper the use of ADS-B for spacing and separation 
purposes and force facilities to revert to legacy radar and radio methods for controlling 
air traffic during peak traffic periods or attack.  The same four participants cited that both 
GPS and ADS-B signals, on either data link, were susceptible to malicious interference 
through jamming although most agreed that sources of the interference should be able to 
be quickly identified and removed.  Three of the four participants also mentioned that 
both 1090-ES and UAT operate on single frequencies which are potentially susceptible to 
jamming, and suggested that a spread spectrum methodology could reduce the 
vulnerability. 
 Four participants also cited multiple methods which are included in the NextGen 
Active Network design to insure availability.  The methods included fusing ADS-B and 
backup radar data, multilateration, TDOA, invoking hybrid surveillance techniques, 
managing system latency, and/or SSR to correlate targets within both airborne and 
ground-based systems. 
 Three of the participants, or 50% of the sample, believed that the design of 
NextGen and the differences between requirements for public airspace and computer 
networks precluded the application of traditional computer network measures of 
availability.  The differences between connection-based computer networks such as the 
wireless network at Starbucks versus the broadcast nature of ADS-B were again 
highlighted.  The ADS-B messages used within the NextGen Active Network are 
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connection-less in nature and broadcast to all aircraft and ground stations within range.  
One user reminded aviators that the potential of lost or gained system availability from 
NextGen did not relieve the pilots from their responsibilities for safe flight. 
Financial Impact 
 The financial impacts of NextGen were split by demographics.  The two 
government employees cited the cost savings purported by the NextGen implementation 
including more efficient spacing, trajectory management, and safety data.  The three 
engineers working for avionics manufacturers cited the sales of new ADS-B systems as 
the fleet is equipped for NextGen.  The final respondent did not see an immediate impact 
to their consulting practice, but seemed to see business as a continuation of ongoing 
advisory tasks.  Table 11 summarizes the perspectives of all participants regarding the 
financial impact of NextGen on their environment. 
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Table 11. 
Perspective Synopsis: Financial Impact 
Perspective 
“…something I work on, but there is no financial impact other than the fact I provide 
consulting services” 
“DoD stands to experience cost savings associated with more efficient use of the 
National Air Space.” 
“…obviously we are going to sell products for ADS-B, and we have already announced 
that.” 
Increased business as aircraft are equipped. 
“It is good for us usually as long as it is 1090.” 
“In the long run – well, what they are trying to do is make the airspace more efficient 
and safer; so in the long run, it could save you money.” 
 
Government, Industry & Education Partnerships 
 The individual perspectives on this topic were quite varied.  One recommendation 
suggested that the three entities develop better methods of measuring information 
security based on context and threat based models weighed against currently acceptable 
risks.  Other participants recommended that academia engage with government and 
industry in consortiums such as RTCA, ICAO, ARC, and participate in Community of 
Interest groups.  One participant specifically cited the FAA’s use of MIT as a technical 
resource when internal resources do not have specialized capabilities required for 
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programs such as NextGen.  Table 12 summarizes the perspectives of all participants 
regarding government, industry, and education partnerships surrounding NextGen. 
Table 12. 
Perspective Synopsis: Government, Industry & Education Partnerships 
Perspective 
“I have long hoped that the government would come up with a better way of looking at 
information security that is contextually based – not only in contextually based and 
threat based – and also look at the risks that have been acceptable in the past.” 
“Participate in COI activities and in data and standards related consortiums.” 
“We hire from a number of colleges and universities.” 
Supporting government and industry partnerships with industry standards and 
rulemaking group memberships.  Supporting industry and academic partnerships by 
participating in this study. 
“…RTCA is where you get a lot of synergy… You have government, industry; a lot of 
times, the academia like MIT, they get hired by the FAA as their technical arm” 
“…we have a lot of industry working on this program.  At times they are.  I mean, I am 
not sure of all the people working on the program.  I mean, it really goes through a large 
group of people, you know, subject matter experts, and things.” 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to identify and describe the risks inherent to the 
active network within the ADS-B portion of the proposed NextGen system and compare 
the proposed enterprise architecture against current best practices in computer network 
security while answering the following primary research questions: 
1. How does proposed ADS-B network design for the NextGen air traffic control 
system compare to government and commercial industry network security 
standards? 
2. How does the ADS-B portion of the proposed NextGen network design perform 
when faced with common computer network threats such as Denial of Service, 
Session Hijacking, and Network Eavesdropping? 
3. How does the ADS-B portion of the NextGen network model insure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability? 
The conclusions regarding the questions that follow are meant to be used to enhance 
the development of the future NextGen air traffic control system.  They discuss the need 
for additional security considerations in light of the similarities and differences between 
NextGen and industry standard computer networks.
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NextGen Comparison to Network Security Standards 
 Based on this research, there are both significant similarities and differences 
between the NextGen Active Network and industry standard computer networks.  Both 
the ADS-B and 802.11 computer networks operate in a wireless environment.  Both are 
designed to move information between local devices, though the ADS-B devices may 
cover 200-300 miles at altitude where the 802.11 computer networks are designed to 
cover a range of 200-300 feet.  Both have methods of insuring a high level of data 
integrity using FEC, CRC, 24-bit parity, or MAC codes.  At this point the similarities 
diverge, as the missions of the two networks are markedly different.   
1. The computer network has designed-in encryption to insure that only 
authenticated computers may access the network and receive information.  
The ADS-B network is designed without encryption or authentication to 
insure that every ADS-B equipped air or ground vehicle is able to receive 
information regarding other vehicles within range.  This difference in ADS-B 
is a safety consideration, but does raise privacy issues within general aviation. 
2. The computer network primarily transmits information between two known IP 
addresses, or very occasionally may transmit to multiple known IP addresses 
if it is sharing some form of streaming media.  Computer transmissions often 
require a handshake or connection that generally results in acknowledgement 
by the receiving computer.  The ADS-B network primarily broadcasts to an 
unknown number of receiving vehicles and/or ground stations, expects no 
acknowledgement and requires no handshake or connection. 
 85
3. Newer computer networks transmit and receive using a spread-spectrum 
methodology that can be difficult to jam because it operates on multiple 
frequencies simultaneously.  The ADS-B network operates two data links on 
different frequencies, but it is not intended that an ADS-B aircraft or ground 
vehicle would be equipped with more than one of the frequencies. 
4. Computer networks insure availability through authentication, denying access 
to devices which cannot successfully authenticate.  The ADS-B network 
insures availability through repeated transmissions at one second intervals, 
and avoids device authentication which would have a potentially negative 
impact.  It is critical to know if an aircraft is in your vicinity or on a collision 
course whether or not it has been properly authenticated by the NextGen 
network. 
Based on the mission differences between the two networks, several of the 
computer network standards pertain, but in a different manner within the ADS-B 
environment.  Maintaining encryption across the envisioned global fleet of ADS-B 
equipped aircraft and vehicles would require managing periodic updates to encryption 
keys.  This process could be self-defeating because either everyone has the keys or the 
keys are never changed, and in both cases the encryption is rapidly cracked or widely 
knowable.  The 1090-ES data link also has bandwidth limitations that would be further 
impacted by encryption overhead. 
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NextGen Performance Against Common Threats 
 The ADS-B portion of the proposed NextGen Active Network has both strong 
points and weaknesses when faced with common computer network threats.  When faced 
with a Denial of Service attack, the UAT data link is fairly robust and more difficult to 
overrun, however, the 1090-ES data link contains not only ADS-B but other transponder 
traffic including Mode S and legacy ATCRBS traffic.  In areas of high traffic density, the 
number of messages received on the 1090 MHz frequency may be more than the total 
bandwidth available and packet loss will occur.  The Denial of Service attack could also 
be induced through malicious interference which would effectively disable ADS-B in 
localized vicinity of the attack.  NextGen design specifications call for the 1090-ES data 
link to be used primarily by 19-seat or larger transport aircraft, and/or aircraft operating 
at or above 24,000 feet.  The weakest data link in this case is supporting aircraft with the 
largest payloads and therefore the highest need for safety. 
 Session Hijacking is much more difficult to induce in an all-RF environment such 
as the airborne portion of the NextGen Active Network.  None of the engineers 
interviewed could determine a reasonable method to induce this effect because the 
transmissions on ADS-B are not connection or session based.  There is a risk that ground 
communications which traverse computer networks could be effected, however, they are 
outside of the scope of this study. 
 The concept of Network Eavesdropping takes on a life of its own in the NextGen 
Active Network.  While computer networks are designed to insure that only the intended 
recipient of a message is able to receive and interpret it, the ADS-B network is designed 
to insure that all ADS-B equipped vehicles are able to receive and interpret all messages.  
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The proposed design has the unfortunate side effect of also allowing reception of all 
ADS-B traffic by anyone with an appropriate radio and decoder.  The raging debate in the 
aviation community surrounds the ability of the public to obtain ADS-B data and know 
all aircraft tracks and destinations.  This becomes a sensitive issue with general aviation 
aircraft used for personal or corporate travel.  Several participants discussed the use of 
anonymous mode, which is only presently available on the UAT data link, to allow 
individual aircraft to transmit a VFR-like code rather than their 24-bit ICAO designator 
which may be mapped back to the aircraft’s tail number.  This is not truly a security 
issue, but an issue of privacy. 
NextGen Compliance with FISMA Objectives 
 As stated in the two previous sections, there are points at which the NextGen 
Active Network and computer networks both correlate and diverge.   
1. Confidentiality is neither desirable nor implemented within the ADS-B 
environment because the designed broadcast medium only works when each 
aircraft understands the position and track of all other aircraft within the vicinity.  
Conversely, the lack of confidentiality can potentially expose the movement of all 
aircraft to the public, which could use the information to track corporate 
movements, personal flights, etc. 
2. Data integrity is designed in to both UAT and 1090-ES data link standards.  UAT 
utilizes forward error correction which results in a 1:100,000,000 (or 10-8) error 
rate.  The 1090-ES data link uses a cyclic redundancy check which results in a 
1:1,000,000 (or 10-6) error rate.  Both data link standards are susceptible to 
spoofing if messages are transmitted from a malicious source. 
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3. Unlike computer networks which can be fairly tolerant to the rate at which 
messages are received and processed, timeliness as measured by latency for the 
NextGen network is critical to accurate functionality.  A delayed message in a 
computer network might cause information to appear slower than you would like 
or induce jitter in a voice over IP telephony connection, but will not likely 
misrepresent your position in reference to another aircraft traveling toward you at 
a high velocity.  NextGen has set very high standards to minimize latency within 
ADS-B.  Unfortunately, other measures of availability within the ADS-B network 
have susceptibilities that are less prevalent in computer networks.  The ability to 
jam the 978 MHz and 1090 MHz frequencies that UAT and 1090-ES occupy, or 
simply overrun the 1090-ES data link with legacy transponder traffic place the 
system at some risk for loss of availability by a Denial of Service attack.  The 
inability of ADS-B alone to determine the authenticity of a message could allow 
spoofing to clutter the CDTI with fictitious aircraft. 
Security Recommendations 
 To address confidentiality concerns, one must weigh the real impact on free 
commerce or perceived loss of personal freedom against the safety of travel within the 
national airspace.  Under no circumstance should an aircraft be invisible to ATC or other 
aircraft while in flight, with the possible exception of special military or state flights such 
as Air Force One.  Virtually all of the information which several groups have requested 
not be disclosed are already freely available on the Internet at sites which utilize existing 
legacy technologies.  This will likely be a long hard-fought legal battle between opposing 
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interest groups, but in the end should have no functional impact on the security of the 
NextGen Active Network. 
 To address integrity concerns, in particular those induced by the possibility of 
spoofing, both airborne and ground-based systems should employ multiple techniques to 
insure that each aircraft appearing on ATC and CDTI screens actually exist, and 
conversely, that each aircraft which is occupying airspace is accurately reflected within 
NextGen.  Multiple methods can and should be employed to assure integrity in this 
context including fusing backup radar signals or hybrid surveillance with ADS-B targets 
to prevent spoofing, the use of multilateration or triangulation using multiple ground 
stations to confirm that an aircraft’s actual position correlates with their transmission 
point in space, and the correlation of airborne ADS-B and SSR (and/or TCAS) 
information to confirm radar range against the ADS-B broadcast position. 
 Existing plans discussed in the recent ARC report on the FAA Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking for ADS-B (ADS-B Aviation Rulemaking Committee, 2008) outline a 
requirement for maximum acceptable latency within the NextGen Active Network and 
will effectively address the timing issue.  Remaining issues revolve around the 
availability of inbound satellite signals for GPS positioning, and inbound aircraft and 
ground signals for ADS-B which reside on two frequencies. None of the ADS-B sources 
are impervious to jamming.  GPS data relies on receiving data from a number of satellites 
and determines data integrity based on the quantity and quality of sources.  UAT and 
1090-ES can both be jammed by other transmissions on their dedicated frequencies, but 
in all cases the symptoms would be quickly noticed and transmitter locations could be 
easily tracked down. 
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 One integrity concern that is partially addressed earlier in this section warrants 
additional concern and recommendation.  Perhaps the greatest potential security threat to 
cooperative surveillance systems such as ADS-B and NextGen is that some aircraft just 
will not cooperate.  Whether the aircraft is being flown by Jihadists seeking to reign 
down terror on the evils of America, a drug runner wishing to escape detection, or just a 
poorly maintained aircraft, there is a grave risk in relying strictly on cooperative 
surveillance.  Some proposals have suggested that eliminating primary radar systems 
could eliminate more than $300 million per annum in operating costs (ADS-B Aviation 
Rulemaking Committee, 2008).  I would strongly advocate retaining secondary ground-
based radar capabilities in at least all high density areas where the risks of accidents and 
consequences are greatest. 
Final Recommendations 
 Unlike foreign ADS-B implementations, the U.S. program has selected multiple 
standards for data communications within NextGen.  This duality causes increased costs 
by requiring additional complexity in the ground stations to include transceivers which 
convert and retransmit UAT information onto the 1090-ES frequency and vice versa.  It 
prevents smaller U.S. aircraft which would be equipped with UAT from integrating with 
ADS-B systems if flown out of the national airspace.  It also prevents 1090-ES aircraft 
from taking advantage of some of the additional applications which will be available only 
on UAT including FIS-B and others not yet envisioned. 
Recognizing that 100% of the large commercial operators have already equipped 
their aircraft by mandate with 1090-ES based transponders and TCAS, the aviation 
community could be throwing good money after old technology by re-using the lower 
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bandwidth 1090-ES solution for our largest carriers instead of selecting the higher 
bandwidth and higher capability UAT solution.  This issue is exacerbated by the number 
of countries controlling large geographic areas which have already published standards 
selecting 1090-ES as a common standard for ADS-B.  Perhaps the best recommendation 
for the present is to continue equipping aircraft with the present 1090-ES and UAT 
solutions over the next 10-15 years while building out the complete ground infrastructure, 
then plan on migrating both frequencies to a single platform solution built around new 
high-bandwidth, spread spectrum, jam resistant technologies, that will undoubtedly exist 
by that point in time.  By planning this far in advance, the FAA, ICAO, Eurocontrol, 
Australia and other pivotal countries may be persuaded to embrace a final common 
standard worldwide. 
Future Research 
A number of the topics covered by this research have left new questions 
discovered and yet unanswered.  Research opportunities within the realm of aviation data 
security abound and will continue to expand with the development of NextGen, the 
discovery of new security threats, and the expansion of technology into aerospace 
industries.  Immediate research interests include: 
1. Research into newer, more cost effective airborne radio and processing 
technologies to allow more rapid equipage of aircraft to the NextGen 
standard. 
2. Research into methods to relieve congestion and improve bandwidth on 
the 1090-ES frequency spectrum. 
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3. Research into common software development and certification standards 
for EFB’s and the growing amount of flight deck automation. 
4. Research into solutions to prevent distribution of privacy information 
beyond the aviation community of interest and other parallels with Digital 
Rights Management. 
 The ability to maintain the security of our airspace and our nation against the 
growing internal and external threats may well define America’s ability to not only 
prosper in the future, but remain a sovereign nation providing leadership and opportunity 
to others worldwide.  Although this study selected one well-defined segment of NextGen 
security, continuing research in all areas is not only recommended but imperative. 
Final Conclusion 
Is the sky falling?  No, but based on this research there are several areas within 
the proposed NextGen Active Network which could be improved to reduce the risks 
which are addressed by computer security standards.
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